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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Minnesota, the evolutions of the related common law 
doctrines res judicata and collateral estoppel have produced a 
magnitude of complex interpretive challenges for Minnesota 
courts.  The dilemma has generated serious discussion within the 
judiciary and the needless encroachment by the legislature within 
the province of regulating judicial procedure exacerbated this 
dilemma.  Minnesota recently attempted to resolve this dispute, 
redefining the relationship between judicial procedure and the 
legislature by outlining a more detailed blueprint by which to apply 
collateral estoppel. 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel exists to bar “a party from 
relitigating an issue determined against that party in an earlier 
action, even if the second action differs significantly from the first 
one.”1  In essence, “collateral estoppel stands for the principle of 
issue preclusion.”2  The doctrine seeks to avoid duplicative 
litigation, achieve consistency of judgments, preserve the public 
trust, and conserve resources by protecting past litigants from the 
adverse consequences of relitigation.3  While a party to the prior 
action is absolutely barred from relitigating the same issue, 
authority is split as to whether the doctrine estopps the party’s 
privies.4  Since the early nineteenth century, proponents of 
collateral estoppel urged that prior rulings also bar privies from 
relitigation; recalling Jeremy Bentham, who called the requirement 
of mutuality “illogical and ill-founded.”5
 
 1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 279 (8th ed. 2004) (defining the various specific 
types of collateral estoppel, but generally explaining collateral estoppel as being 
applicable even when the second action differs from the first). 
 2. State v. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d 650, 658 (Minn. 2007) (citing Hauschildt v. 
Beckingham, 686 N.W.2d 829, 837 (Minn. 2004)).  See generally JACK H. 
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.9 (4th ed. 2005) (explaining the 
differences between collateral estoppel, which is issue preclusion; whereas res 
judicata is claim preclusion). 
 3. Grover Hartt, III & Jonathan L. Blacker, Judicial Application of Issue 
Preclusion in Tax Litigation: Illusion or Illumination?, 59 TAX LAW. 205, 208–09 (2005) 
(discussing the broad goals of issue preclusion, before moving into a discussion of 
how the doctrine specifically bars relitigation in partnership tax proceedings in 
section IV.C). 
 4. 50 C.J.S. JUDGMENTS § 831 (2008) (outlining the requirements for 
determining which parties will be bound for the purposes of collateral estoppel by 
a prior ruling, and recognizing that there is not a definitive answer to whether 
privies should be bound by such rulings). 
 
 5. Jack Ratliff, Offensive Collateral Estoppel and the Option Effect, 67 TEX. L. REV. 
63, 72 (1988) (citing to JEREMY BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 7 WORKS OF 
2
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The Minnesota Supreme Court recently addressed the degree 
of privity required between state agencies to bind a party for the 
purposes of collateral estoppel in driving while intoxicated (DWI) 
proceedings in State v. Lemmer.6  In Minnesota, an arrest for DWI 
results in a civil implied consent hearing against the Commissioner 
of Public Safety and a criminal DWI prosecution by the state.7  In 
2002, the state legislature enacted subdivision (3)(g) to section 
169A.53 of the Minnesota Statutes, precluding defensive collateral 
estoppel against the state in the criminal proceeding based on 
rulings made in district court during the implied consent hearing.8  
The Lemmer case arrived before the Minnesota Supreme Court in 
2007, arising from a dispute over an order by the court of appeals 
that upheld the constitutionality of section 169A.53(3)(g), which 
permits the state to relitigate issues previously determined in 
Lemmer’s implied consent hearing.9  The court affirmed that the 
two state agencies involved in DWI proceedings were not in privity 
and remanded Lemmer’s case to trial.10
 
JEREMY BENTHAM 171 (J. Bowring ed., 1843)). 
 6. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 660–61. 
 7. Id. at 654.  There are two proceedings resultant to DWI arrests in 
Minnesota: first, there is the civil action for driver’s license revocation; and 
second, the criminal prosecution.  See MINN. STAT. §§ 169A.50–53 (2006). 
 8. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 655–56 (explaining that the legislature abrogated 
the decision reached in State v. Victorsen, 627 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001)).  
The legislation was created when Minnesota Statute section 169A.53(3)(g) was 
adopted on April 4, 2002, making clear that the implied consent hearing no 
longer gives rise to collateral estoppel in criminal prosecutions.  See Act of Apr. 4, 
2002, ch. 314, § 1 subdiv. 3(g), 2002 Minn. Laws 509–11 (codified as amended at 
MINN. STAT. § 169A.53(3)(g)).  The significance of this passage is in the fact that 
the court recognized that the legislature deliberately challenged what the court 
ruled a procedural mechanism, illustrating that the court allowed the legislature 
to involve itself in the distinct province of the judiciary. 
 9. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 653–54. 
 10. Id. at 663. 
 
This note begins by presenting a brief history of issue 
preclusion before proceeding to discuss the evolution of the privity 
requirements under collateral estoppel in Minnesota DWI cases.  It 
then examines the Lemmer case to understand why the Minnesota 
Supreme Court determined that collateral estoppel did not apply.  
Finally, this note concludes with an analysis of public policy 
concerns to illustrate some potential ways that the Lemmer decision 
may impede judicial efficiency and debase public trust in the 
judiciary. 
3
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II. EVOLUTION OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN MINNESOTA 
A. Early Common Law Roots 
“Collateral estoppel has long been an important part of Anglo-
American common law.”11  The doctrine is believed to stem from 
the Roman principle of res judicata12 and Germanic ideas of equity, 
holding that parties of past litigation were estopped from 
relitigating previously decided issues.13  Prior to the adoption of 
collateral estoppel by English courts, the structure of the writ 
system encouraged duplicative litigation by offering nominally 
different causes of action to be applied to the same facts.14  
Protective mechanisms aimed at preventing the harms of 
duplicative suits progressed and became incorporated into the 
fabric of the English common law system, ultimately taking shape as 
the doctrine of “estoppel by record” first cited in 1803 by the King’s 
Bench in Outram v. Morewood.15  This type of estoppel was later 
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Hopkins v. Lee in 
1821.16
 
 11. Richard B. Kennelly, Jr., Precluding the Accused: Offensive Collateral Estoppel 
in Criminal Cases, 80 VA. L. REV. 1379, 1390 (1994) (discussing the rapid evolution 
and development of the collateral estoppel doctrine in American common law). 
 12. Robert Wyness Millar, The Premises of the Judgment as Res Judicata in 
Continental and Anglo-American Law, 39 MICH. L. REV. 238, (1940) (explaining the 
roots of the doctrine of collateral estoppel and their development in American 
jurisprudence). 
 13. Charles William Hendricks, 100 Years of Double Jeopardy Erosion: Collateral 
Estoppel Made Extinct, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 379, 391–92 (2000) (positing that the roots 
of collateral estoppel share some history with the Roman ideas of res judicata, but 
that the specific feature of collateral estoppel evolved from “Germanic origins.”  
The article then discusses the evolution of the doctrine in the criminal arena 
under the provisions of the 5th Amendment of the United States Constitution). 
 14. See Colin Hugh Buckley, Issue Preclusion and Issues of Law: A Doctrinal 
Framework Based on Rules of Recognition, Jurisdiction and Legal History, 24 HOUS. L. 
REV. 875, 877 (1987) (examining the flaws in the application of collateral 
estoppel).  Mr. Buckley posits that the rules of the doctrine lack structure and rely 
too heavily on ad hoc policy considerations.  Id. at 880–81. 
 15. Hendricks, supra note 13, at 391 (citing the British adoption of civil 
collateral estoppel in Outram v. Morewood, 102 Eng. Rep. 630, 633 (K.B. 1803)). 
 16. Hopkins v. Lee, 19 U.S. 109, 113 (1821).  An early discussion of collateral 
estoppel declaring a litigant may not take the same issue to another venue to 
relitigate a “fact which has been directly tried, and decided by a Court of 
competent jurisdiction, cannot be contested again between the same parties . . . .”  
Id. 
  Civil proceedings in the American courts first recognized 
the expansion of the doctrine to privies of prior litigants in 1876, as 
4
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acknowledged in Cromwell v. County of Sac.17
Over time, the doctrine of collateral estoppel developed in the 
American common law and was recorded in the Restatement (First) of 
Judgments in 1942, where it was written that any fact actually 
litigated to finality would be conclusive in subsequent litigation 
between the parties.
 
18  The Restatement (Second) of Judgments 
expanded this concept to include prior conclusions made on the 
law as well.19  Each state is free to determine the application of 
common law nuances, but “all states have adopted the common law 
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel in some form.”20
B. Minnesota and the Mutuality Requirement 
 
Minnesota’s modern common law understanding of the 
doctrine explains that previous decisions are conclusive in 
subsequent actions when a party can demonstrate that “(1) [the] 
issue is identical to one in prior adjudication; (2) there is a final 
judgment on the merits; (3) [the] estopped party [is the same] 
party or in privity with [the] party to prior adjudication; and (4) 
[the] estopped party was given full and fair opportunity to be heard 
on adjudicated issue.”21
Despite a nominal commitment to the generally understood 
principles of collateral estoppel, Minnesota lastingly adhered to the 
rule that findings made at DWI implied consent hearings did not 
collaterally estop prosecutors from relitigating the same issues 
during the later criminal prosecution.
 
22
 
 17. Hendricks, supra note 13, at 391 (attributing the inception of applying 
civil collateral estoppel against privies of prior litigants as well as to the prior 
adjudicated parties to Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 353 (1876)). 
 18. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 68(1) (1942). 
 19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). 
 20. Pamela A. Mann,  Federalism Issues and Title VII: Kremer v. Chemical 
Construction Corp., 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 411, 423 (1985) (discussing the 
ways in which preclusion principles have been adopted by all of the states and the 
federal courts). 
 21. 1 DAVID F. HERR & ROGER S. HAYDOCK, MINNESOTA PRACTICE, CIVIL RULES 
ANNOTATED, RULE 8.03, § 8.5 (4th ed. 2008) (citing AFSCME Council No. 14, Local 
Union No. 517 v. Washington County Bd. of Comm'rs, 527 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1995)). 
 22. 9A HENRY W. MCCARR & JACK S. NORDBY, MINN. PRAC. § 56.33 (3d ed. 2007) 
(discussing the state of Minnesota law prior to the decision in State v. Victorsen, 627 
N.W.2d 655 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001)). 
  This facilitated DWI 
proceedings that resembled the early “doctrine of mutuality of the 
parties,” which originally functioned to exclusively restrict collateral 
5
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estoppel for use against persons who were named as parties in the 
prior litigation.23
Jurisdictions who had once maintained this historical 
limitation upon defensive collateral estoppel realized the attendant 
costs, and sought to strengthen estoppel by broadening its scope by 
“rejection[] of the mutuality requirement.”
 
24  Many jurisdictions 
rejected mutuality, endorsing the California Supreme Court’s 1942 
“landmark” rejection of the doctrine of mutuality in Bernhard v. 
Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association.25  The 
rejection of mutuality attained even greater status in 1971, when 
the United States Supreme Court expressly rejected mutuality in 
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation.26  
The Court agreed that the doctrine of mutuality was undergoing a 
“fundamental change” because “an increasing number of courts 
have rejected the principle as unsound.”27  Although the language 
used by the Court indicates that it may not have intended for this 
rejection of mutuality to be universally applied beyond the sphere 
of patent and trademark litigation, “the federal courts embraced 
the Supreme Court’s approach and applied it to a variety of cases.” 
28
 
 23. Donald L. Catlett, Charles D. Moreland & Janet M. Thompson, Collateral 
Estoppel in Criminal Cases: How and Where Does It Apply?, 62 J. MO. B. 370, 370 (Nov.-
Dec., 2006) (explaining that judgments evolved under the doctrine to estop 
litigants who were in privity with the prior party subsequent to the more limited 
earlier understandings of the doctrine that required a strict showing of mutuality 
of the parties). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Federal or State Law as Governing in Matters of 
Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Federal Tort Claims Act Suit, 49 A.L.R. FED. 326 
(1980) (citing Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 122 P.2d 892 
(Cal. 1942)) (because most states have abandoned the mutuality of estoppel, and 
because most federal courts defer to state law on the issue, it can be said that most 
jurisdictions abandoned mutuality). 
 26. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).  This was an early case that dealt with the framework 
for collateral estoppel.  It did not address the same kind of collateral estoppel that 
was being discussed in the Lemmer case.  It should be noted that while Lemmer was 
asking the court to acknowledge that defensive collateral estoppel should apply to 
his DWI case, Blonder-Tongue is discussing the fact that collateral estoppel may also 
be used offensively, that is, to preclude a defendant from suing a plaintiff who had 
previously won in a final disposition of an identical claim by a similarly situated 
defendant.  This case is cited for the proposition that mutuality was being 
abandoned and that expansion is applicable regardless of which type of collateral 
estoppel the court applies. 
 27. Id. at 327.  See also Hartt, supra note 3, at 211. 
 28. Hartt, supra note 3, at 211–12. 
  Following the federal system’s lead, “[m]any but not all state 
6
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courts have rejected the mutuality requirement.”29  It would not be 
until 1990 that Minnesota’s conceptualization of collateral estoppel 
would expressly abandon the doctrine of mutuality.30
As the judiciary recognized “the erosion of the mutuality 
doctrine, the courts expanded the application of collateral 
estoppel.”
 
31  More specifically, the evolution of the aforementioned 
doctrines illustrates a general trend towards establishing a more 
unrestrained recognition of privity between related litigants.  This 
expansive approach was declared over thirty years ago when the 
court posited the federal majority rule was that “[a] person may be 
bound by a judgment even though not a party if one of the parties 
to the suit is so closely aligned with his interests as to be his virtual 
representative.”32
C. Minnesota Mutuality in DWI Proceedings 
 
1. State v. Juarez 
One of the earlier Minnesota cases in the chain of case law 
preceding Lemmer was the 1984 case State v. Juarez.33  Juarez was 
factually similar to Lemmer in that Commissioner of Public Safety 
represented the state at the implied consent hearing.34  Juarez 
argued that there was no reasonable basis to give him a 
breathalyzer test during a traffic stop.35  At the implied consent 
hearing, the district court agreed, dismissing the case.36  The City of 
Burnsville represented the state at the subsequent criminal trial.37
 
 29. Rydstrom, supra note 25, at 326. 
 30. Aufderhar v. Data Dispatch, Inc., 452 N.W.2d 648, 652 (Minn. 1990).  
Prior to Aufderhar, Minnesota courts had adopted as the governing principle that: 
[t]he requirement of mutuality must yield to public policy. To hold 
otherwise would be to allow repeated litigation of identical questions, 
expressly adjudicated, and to allow a litigant having lost on a question of 
fact to re-open and re-try all the old issues each time he can obtain a new 
adversary not in privity with his former one. 
Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 256, 72 N.W.2d 364, 369 (1955) (quoting 
Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 172 A. 260, 262 (Del. Super. Ct. 1934)). 
 31. See Hartt, supra note 3, at 212. 
 32. Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 719 (5th Cir. 1975). 
 33. State v. Juarez, 345 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). 
 34. Id. at 802. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
  
In that proceeding, Juarez was able to collaterally estop the 
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prosecution from introducing evidence collected during the stop.38
The state appealed and the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
reviewed the applicability of collateral estoppel in this instance.
 
39  
The court applied State v. House40 for the proposition that the 
Commissioner of Public Safety is not the same party as the City of 
Burnsville and is therefore free to relitigate the evidentiary rulings 
of the implied consent hearing.41  The issue was remanded, leaving 
the Minnesota rule clear that collateral estoppel may not  apply 
between these government agencies.42
2. State v. Victorsen 
 
In 2001, Minnesota seemed to change its position, aligning 
itself more closely to the modern majority opinion when the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals ruled on State v. Victorsen.43  Rejecting 
the State’s arguments that it did not have fair notice to 
participate,44 the court found that the Commissioner of Public 
Safety and the State of Minnesota were in privity for the purposes 
of DWI prosecution and that findings made in the civil implied 
consent action would  bind in district court during the subsequent 
criminal prosecution.45  This opinion was also in line with other 
jurisdictions regarding the notion that determinations made in the 
civil action may be binding during a subsequent criminal action.46
This shift toward a more liberal privity requirement was short-
lived; Minnesota almost immediately reverted towards mutuality 
when the Minnesota legislature “acted purposefully to abrogate the 
 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. State v. House, 291 Minn. 424, 192 N.W.2d 93 (1971). 
 41. Juarez, 345 N.W. 2d at 802. 
 42. Id. at 803. 
 43. State v. Victorsen, 627 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (speaking 
to the idea that collateral estoppel would apply because there was privity between 
the Commissioner of Public Safety and the State of Minnesota, thereby overruling 
the previous leading Minnesota case, which had established that privity did not 
exist between the agencies); cf. Juarez, 345 N.W.2d at 802. 
 44. Victorsen, 627 N.W.2d at 662–63. 
 45. Id. at 661 (recognizing privity between two state agencies based on the 
fact that the state is the real party at interest). 
 46. See Debra E. Wax, Annotation, Doctrine of Res Judicata or Collateral Estoppel 
as Barring Relitigation in State Criminal Proceedings of Issues Previously Decided in 
Administrative Proceedings, 30 A.L.R. 4th 856 (1984) (discussing that most 
jurisdictions recognize the application of collateral estoppel in criminal 
proceedings, whether the prior action be civil or administrative). 
8
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holding in Victorsen”47 by enacting section 169A.53(3)(g) during the 
following legislative session in April of 2002.48  This statutory 
amendment precluded a defendant from invoking collateral 
estoppel during a criminal prosecution on any ruling made at the 
implied- consent hearing.49
In November of 2005, the legislature’s power to enact a statute 
governing collateral estoppel was successfully challenged in State v. 
Brunclik, when the constitutionality of section 169A.53(3)(g) was 
called into question.
 
50  The Goodhue County court hearing the 
argument held that the statute violated the separation of powers 
doctrine by allowing the legislature to amend court procedures and 
issued an injunction against all state agencies, precluding them 
from enforcing section 169A.53(3)(g).51
D. The Effect of Lemmer on Collateral Estoppel 
 
All of the aforementioned constitutional conclusions were 
validated when the district court, initially hearing Ronald 
Lemmer’s criminal case, dismissed the charges against Lemmer 
based on the civil ruling.52  During the state’s appeal, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the Brunclik injunction was 
sufficiently preserved for review by reference in the trial court 
record.53  The court then reexamined its authority to issue an 
injunction overturning the constitutionality of legislative 
modification to collateral estoppel 54
During the appeal, the question that would determine the 
application of collateral estoppel in Minnesota became whether or 
not the district court erred in adopting the Brunclik injunction 
previously issued by the Goodhue County court.
 
55
 
 47. State v. Lemmer, 716 N.W.2d 657, 661 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006). 
 48. See MINN. STAT. § 169A.53(3)(g). 
 49. State v. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d 650, 655–56 (Minn. 2007). The court writes 
that the enactment of section 169A.53(3)(g) was done to abrogate the Victorsen 
ruling.  Id. at 655. 
 50. Id. at 654 (discussing State v. Brunclik, No. T8-04-4705 (Minn. Dist. Ct., 
Nov. 8, 2005)). 
 51. Id. at 656. 
 52. Lemmer, 716 N.W.2d at 661. 
 53. Id. at 661. 
 54. Id. at 663–64. 
 55. Id. at 661–62. 
  The appellate 
court focused on distinguishing between the substantive and the 
procedural nature of collateral estoppel, reasoning that only 
9
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substantive law was within the legislature’s scope of constitutional 
authority, and thereby not subject to the judiciary striking it 
down.56  The Minnesota Court of Appeals ultimately determined to 
align itself with “the federal courts, including the Eighth Circuit, 
[which] have arrived at near unanimity... concluding that it is 
substantive.”57  It was this finding that led the court to conclude 
that the legislature could mandate the use of collateral estoppel 
and that section 169A.53(3)(g) was in fact constitutional.58  Having 
so held, the appellate court reversed the earlier decision as clear 
error on the part of the district court for wrongfully determining 
that section 169A.53(3)(g) was procedural and thereby 
unconstitutional.59  Lemmer was remanded for rehearing.60
Confusion resulted from the contradictory understandings 
encompassed within these holdings, creating a fundamental rift in 
the interpretation of collateral estoppel in Minnesota.  The 
disparity between the Brunclik injunction and the Lemmer appeal 
resulted in the creation of legislative authority to deny collateral 
estoppel, raising still more questions about the separation of 
powers between the state legislature and the judiciary.  It was on 
these questions that Lemmer again appealed, and in 2007, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court attended to whether the legislature held 
the constitutional authority to dictate the application of collateral 
estoppel and whether the two state agencies were in privity.
 
61
III. THE LEMMER CASE 
 
A. Factual Background 
On June 4, 2005, the Scott County Sheriff’s department was in 
pursuit of a suspect who had reportedly fled the scene of an 
automobile accident to the residence of Ronald Lemmer.62  The 
suspect took Lemmer’s boat with Lemmer as his passenger.63  The 
suspect was arrested, and Lemmer began driving the boat back to 
his home.64
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 662. 
 58. Id. at 663. 
 59. Id. at 660. 
 60. Id. at 664. 
 61. See State v. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d 650 (Minn. 2007). 
 62. Id. at 653. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
  During Lemmer’s operation of the boat, the Deputy 
10
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Sherriff stopped Lemmer, boarded the boat, reportedly observed 
Lemmer’s intoxication and arrested Lemmer for operation of a 
motor vehicle while intoxicated.65  Lemmer was charged with a 
third-degree DWI.66
At his implied consent hearing against the Commissioner of 
Public Safety, the district court overturned the revocation of 
Lemmer’s driver’s license because the evidence against Lemmer 
had been obtained during an unconstitutional stop for which there 
had been no “particularized and objective basis.”
 
67  The state later 
tried Lemmer on criminal DWI charges and Lemmer moved to 
dismiss them on the theory that the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
precluded the state from relitigating the evidentiary findings made 
in his civil hearing.68
B. Procedural Posture of Lemmer 
 
The district court agreed that the relitigation of the evidentiary 
ruling made at the implied consent hearing was unconstitutional 
because the legislature’s enactment of section 169A.53(3)(g) was a 
regulation of judicial procedure, and thereby a violation of the 
separation of powers doctrine.69  The court dismissed the criminal 
charges against Lemmer and the state appealed.70
C. An Appeal for Comity 
 
Lemmer argued that an appeal should not be granted because 
the state was collaterally attacking the judicially created law 
contained in the Brunclik order, but the court of appeals agreed 
with the state that the statute is constitutional despite the Brunclik 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 653.  Motorboats are motor vehicles under Minnesota law.  MINN. 
STAT. § 169A.03 subdiv. 15.  The state charged Lemmer with DWI for operating a 
motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over .10 under Minnesota 
Statute section 169A.20 subdivision 1.  Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 653.  Because 
Lemmer had a prior DWI conviction, he was charged with third degree 
misdemeanor DWI for the presence of an “aggravating factor” under Minnesota 
Statute section 169A.26.  Id. 
 67. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 653.  Lemmer was not stopped legally under 
Minnesota Constitution article I, section 10, which requires a “particularized and 
objective basis” to stop the operator of a motor vehicle.  Id. at 659.  See also MINN. 
CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 68. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 654. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See State v. Lemmer, 716 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006). 
11
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injunction.71  The court of appeals was able to reach this decision 
because it held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel was 
substantive rather than procedural, therefore within the sphere 
that the legislature has power to regulate.72  To make this 
connection, the appellate court relied upon an outcome-
determinative test to conclude that the application of collateral 
estoppel was substantive law.73  The court writes, “if the law is 
outcome determinative—if it will influence the outcome of the 
case—then it is substantive and not merely procedural.”74  To use 
the words “outcome determinative” in this expansive sense would 
definitely fulfill the substantive standard because reversing the 
decision of a district court will always clearly influence the outcome 
of the case.  As if there were anything that would not meet this 
incredibly broad application of the test, the court of appeals went 
on to determine that the Lemmer court had not actually relied on 
the injunction during his criminal trial anyway.75  Rather, the 
appellate court noted that the district court had merely taken the 
injunction under advisement in reaching its decision.76
The court of appeals goes on to say that regardless of whether 
this statute is constitutional, the district court may put aside any 
concerns of constitutionality to uphold the statute as a matter of 
comity.
 
77  The courts must “exercise great restraint prior to striking 
down a statute as unconstitutional....”78
 
 71. Id. at 654. Lemmer moved to strike the state’s argument that the district 
court erred in ruling Minnesota Statute § 169A.53 subdiv. 3(g) unconstitutional 
because the attack “constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the 
injunction issued in Brunclik.”  Id.  The state supreme court ruled that Lemmer 
failed to seek enforcement of the injunction at the district court level.  Id. at 656.  
Instead, the district court took the existence of the injunction under advisement 
and applied it when ruling on the case.  Id.  Therefore, the state was not 
challenging the Brunclik injunction, but rather was challenging whether Brunclik 
properly supported the district court’s decision.  Id. at 654. 
 72. See Lemmer, 716 N.W.2d at 662–64. 
 73. Id. at 662.  The outcome-determinative test is a system used to determine 
whether a rule is substantive or procedural.  Id.  The federal courts typically 
employ this test to discern if federal courts should follow state or federal rules on 
the grounds that these courts are within the scope of appropriate authority 
granted to the judiciary.  See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 74. Lemmer, 716 N.W.2d at 662 (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465–69 
(1965)). 
 75. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 656. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Lemmer, 716 N.W.2d at 663–64. 
 78. Id. at 662.  See also State v. Willis, 332 N.W. 2d 180, 184 (Minn. 1980). 
  This restraint is the result 
of respect for the co-equal branches of government and a tendency 
12
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to grant comity to statutes that do not present a clear invasion of 
another branch’s authority.79  The effect of the court of appeals’s 
reversal was to preclude Lemmer from asserting collateral estoppel; 
the case was remanded to district court for new trial.80  Lemmer 
appealed this ruling to the Minnesota Supreme Court.81
D. Lemmer at the Supreme Court of Minnesota 
 
The outcome of the Lemmer decision by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court turned on whether collateral estoppel applies 
between the state agencies as parties in privity.82  The supreme 
court began its analysis by first resolving the issues that were central 
to Lemmer’s first appeal, namely, whether the denial of collateral 
estoppel in DWI proceedings was within the scope of the 
legislature’s authority.83  The court writes “[t]he judicial branch 
governs procedural matters, while the creation of substantive law is 
a legislative function.”84  The court clarifies this understanding by 
analogizing collateral estoppel to an evidentiary ruling, something 
that is purely procedural and does not create a substantive change 
in the law.85  After correctly applying the substantive law analysis, 
the court continues by overturning the appellate court finding on 
the ruling regarding collateral estoppel, “conclud[ing] that 
collateral estoppel is not substantive in function.”86
 
 79. See Lemmer, 716 N.W.2d at 662–64. 
 80. Id. at 664. 
 81. See Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 656. 
 82. See generally id. 
 83. See id. at 657. 
 84. Id. (citing State v. Johnson, 514 N.W.2d 551, 554 (Minn. 1994)).  The 
Johnson court determined that the application of collateral estoppel was not for the 
legislature because it is strictly procedural in that “[collateral estoppel] neither 
creates a new cause of action nor deprives defendant of any defense on the 
merits.”  Johnson, 514 N.W.2d at 555 (quoting Strauch v. Superior Court, 107 Cal. 
App. 3d 45, 49 (Ct. App. 1980)). 
 85. See Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 658. 
 86. Id.  The court elaborates that collateral estoppel is procedural only and 
analogous to an evidentiary ruling and strictly for the consideration of the 
judiciary.  Id.  This is not yet codified in article III, section 1 of the Minnesota 
Constitution.  This section of the constitution still reflects the court of appeals 
ruling in State v. Lemmer, 716 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006), aff’d, 736 N.W.2d 
650 (Minn. 2007) (affirming denial of collateral estoppel, but overruling the 
appellate court on the issue of collateral estoppel being a concern of the 
legislature). 
  Holding that 
the application of collateral estoppel is a determination to be made 
by the judicial branch, the court next considered whether or not 
13
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collateral estoppel should apply in Lemmer’s case.87
The Minnesota Supreme Court recites the occasions when 
collateral estoppel can be applied:(1) the issue was 
identical to one in a prior adjudication; (2) there was a 
final judgment on the merits; (3) the estopped party was a 
party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; 
and (4) the estopped party was given a full and fair 
opportunity to be heard on the adjudicated issue.
 
88
The court concedes that the first two elements are met, but the 
issues of sameness or privity and full opportunity to be heard are 
not.
 
89  This was held in large part because the agencies are not the 
same—or in privity—and they direct authoritative roles so distinct 
from one another that collateral estoppel would interfere with their 
authority to accomplish their respective duties.90
The court also focuses a lot of attention on the fact that the 
agencies are represented by different legal counsel, and thereby 
not well-represented at the respective proceedings to constitute full 
and fair opportunity.
 
91  The court also reasons that each party must 
be motivated by self-interest, have controlling participation and the 
right to appeal to constitute full and fair opportunity to be heard.92  
The Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the privity reasoning of 
the lower court and narrowly affirmed the court of appeals 
judgment by a 4-3 split.93
The essence of the Lemmer decision is to deny collateral 
 
 
 87. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 658–59. 
 88. Id. at 659. 
 89. Id. at 659–63. 
 90. See id. at 661.  Applying preclusion would interfere with the proper 
allocation of authority between state agencies or officials.  See State v. Fritz, 527 
A.2d 1157, 1166 (Conn. 1987) (holding that a Connecticut state agency 
administrative ruling did not estop the state from relitigating the same issue in a 
criminal court).  See also State v. Miller, 459 S.E.2d 114, 125 (W. Va. 1995) 
(holding that a ruling made during a West Virginia administrative employee 
grievance hearing did not estop the state from relitigating the same issue for 
criminal purposes).  See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 36, cmt. f 
(1982). 
 91. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 661. The statutes establishing the roles of county 
attorney and the attorney general, respectively, separate the situations in which 
each has jurisdiction and sets forth that each can only be involved in the 
proceedings of the other by permission.  MINN. STAT. § 388.051 (2006); MINN. 
STAT. § 8.06 (2006). 
 92. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 661 (citing Kaiser v. N. States Power Co., 353 
N.W.2d 899, 904 (Minn. 1984); Ramsey v. Stevens, 283 N.W.2d 918, 924 (Minn. 
1979)). 
 93. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 657. 
14
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estoppel in DWI proceedings because: 1) the commissioner of 
public safety serves an authoritative role distinctly different from 
than that of the state to establish privity; 2) each agency is 
represented by different legal counsel; and 3) each agency lacked 
the full and fair opportunity to control the litigation in the other’s 
suit.94
IV. DISASSEMBLING THE LEMMER DECISION 
 
A. Introduction 
At its heart, Lemmer is a debate as to whether the elements of 
collateral estoppel are satisfied by the relationships between the 
parties in the present case.  The first step in understanding the 
court’s refusal to apply collateral estoppel to Lemmer’s case is to 
note that estoppel is held as a judicial procedural rule.95  Despite 
this attention to constitutional issues, the central focus of Lemmer is 
how to apply the rule of collateral estoppel, and not whether the 
court has the authority to apply the rule.96  The court ultimately 
reaches the conclusion that collateral estoppel is inapplicable 
because privity did not exist between the Commissioner of Public 
Safety and the state during this DWI proceeding.  This conclusion, 
however, seems difficult to rectify with “[t]he general rule... that a 
government official is considered to be in privity with his or her 
governmental employer... since the suit is in essence really against 
the government.”97
Minnesota explicitly abandoned the requirement of strict 
mutuality,
 
98  but its refusal to apply collateral estoppel in the instant 
case seems an unjust return to allowing “one who has had his day in 
court to reopen identical issues by merely switching adversaries.”99
 
 94. Id. at 660–63. 
 95. Id. at 657 (citing State v. Lindsey, 632 N.W.2d 652, 658–59 (Minn. 2001)). 
 96. Id. 
 97. 47 AM. JUR. 2D JUDGMENTS § 623 (2008) (noting that this general rule only 
applies when the official is involved in the litigation in their official capacity). 
 98. Aufderhar v. Data Dispatch, Inc., 452 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Minn. 1990) 
(discussing that strangers to the prior action may be affected by the ruling even 
without a showing of strict identity).  See also Ellis v. Minneapolis Comm'n on Civil 
Rights, 319 N.W.2d 702, 704 (Minn. 1982) (setting forth the requirements for a 
defendant who was not a party to earlier proceedings to claim collateral estoppel). 
  
 99. Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass’n., 122 P.2d 892, 895 (Cal. 
1942).  Justice Traynor, writing for a unanimous court in a landmark opinion, 
expressly noted the abandonment of strict mutuality based on the thought that 
“[n]o satisfactory rationalization has been advanced for the requirement of 
15
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The following analyzes the privity and interrelationships of state 
agencies to understand the wall that Minnesota constructed to 
separate the respective civil and criminal tracks in DWI 
proceedings. 
B. The Conflicting Functions of Government Agency? 
The majority’s first justification for denying collateral estoppel 
is the determination that the state and the Commissioner of Public 
Safety have important differences in authority and are therefore 
not in privity.100  The general rule is to the contrary,101 but finding 
that different authoritative functions exist between government 
agencies is one justifiable rationale for an exception to the rule 
otherwise holding government agencies to be in privity with one 
another.102  Cases that depart from the general rule finding privity 
between government officials are based in large part on the 
thought that the unique responsibilities of the respective agencies 
are not represented at each proceeding and that consolidation may 
interfere with each government official’s “proper allocation of 
authority.”103
The majority draws much of its support for this conclusion 
through the premises cited to in State v. House, State v. Miller, and 
State v. Fritz.
 
104
 
mutuality.  Just why a party who was not bound by a previous action should be 
precluded from asserting it as res judicata against a party who was bound by it is 
difficult to comprehend.”  Id. 
 100. State v. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d 650, 661 (Minn. 2007).  Government 
agencies are generally estopped from relitigating identical issues, but “exceptions 
may be warranted if there are important differences in the authority of the 
respective agencies.”  18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR D. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1006 (2d. ed. 2002). 
 101. See 47 AM. JUR. 2D JUDGMENTS § 623 (noting that governments and 
governmental agencies and their officers are in privity with one another). 
 102. 18A WRIGHT, supra note 100, § 1006. 
 103. 50 C.J.S. JUDGMENTS § 869 (2008).  Discussing this exception, the article 
cites Juan C. v. Cortines, 89 N.Y.2d 659 (1997).  This case is cited in support of the 
proposition that a school administrator could relitigate an evidentiary suppression 
in an effort to suspend a student through the administration’s unique authority to 
protect other students and therefore was not in privity with the city attorney, who 
was responsible for prosecuting the delinquency action.  Id. 
 104. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 660 (citing State v. House, 291 Minn. 424, 425, 192 
N.W.2d 93, 94–95 (1971); State v. Fritz, 527 A.2d 1157, 1165 (Conn. 1987); State v. 
Miller, 459 S.E.2d 114, 124 (W. Va. 1995)). 
  These cases are marshaled in support of the notion 
that privity does not exist because despite litigating similar 
questions, one involved state agency is not able to pursue the 
16
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determination of guilt or innocence during the administrative 
proceeding.105  While the referenced cases do speak to the state 
agencies’ ability to fulfill their authoritative goals, the more 
genuine focus of those cases is the procedural divergence between 
a criminal court and an administrative hearing.106
1. State v. House 
 
In ruling on the DWI proceeding State v. House,107 the 
Minnesota Supreme Court held that an attorney representing the 
state in a DWI criminal prosecution did not have the authority to 
make a plea bargain that would dismiss the penalties of a 
subsequent implied consent proceeding.108  The court explains that 
the state has authority to act in criminal proceedings, but “has no 
authority to act in civil cases.”109  Rather, it is the Commissioner of 
Public Safety who is authorized by the state of Minnesota to act in 
the civil cases.110  Before moving on to discuss privity, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court asserted these points of law from House 
to reject Lemmer’s argument that the commissioner and the 
district attorney were the same party.111
The first reason that House is inapplicable in the present case is 
that although subdivision 1(c) of the Minnesota Statutes section 
388.051 does authorize the Commissioner of Public Safety to 
represent the state at the civil case, the statute also clearly 
authorizes the attorney general to represent the state at a civil 
matter by request of the Commissioner.
 
112
 
 105. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 660 (citing Fritz, 527 A.2d at 1165; Miller, 459 
S.E.2d at 124) (using the cases to reiterate the proposition that just because parties 
are interested in same facts they are not necessarily in privity). 
 106. Id. at 660.  The majority relies on Miller and Fritz for the proposition that 
government agencies may not be in privity simply for having the same goals in the 
proceeding.  Id. at 660–61.  The dissent argues this is an incorrect marshalling of 
Fritz and Miller because “the probable cause determination in Lemmer's implied 
consent proceeding . . . [was] made de novo by a judge, not an administrative 
officer.”  Id. at 671 (Hansen, J., dissenting). 
 107. House, 291 Minn. at 425, 192 N.W.2d at 95. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 660. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 660–61. 
 112. MINN. STAT. § 388.051 subdiv. 1(c). 
  This essentially affords 
the state the option of having either of its designated attorneys 
direct the civil case, illustrating that any lack of authority cannot be 
describing “authority” in the statutory sense. 
17
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Furthermore, the denial of privity in House was made 
regarding an analysis of a distinguishably different point of law.  
The very narrow authoritative question that House turned on was 
whether allowing the attorney at the criminal case to waive part of 
the civil penalty interfered with the Department of Public Safety’s 
express and solitary authority to later impose its sanctions on 
driver’s licensure.  The House court analyzed this more specific 
issue and only stated in dicta that the parties were not the same.113
This question of authority is irrelevant to the resolution of 
Lemmer’s case, which turned on collateral estoppel being applied on 
a complete and final evidentiary ruling, not the anticipatory waiver 
of other parties’ rights.  Employing House for this proposition is 
insufficient to distinguish the parties in Lemmer because the parties 
shared the same goal and rights: attempting to get the evidence 
admitted.  House was essentially a ruling that one party could not 
act to affect a right that was specifically reserved to the other 
party.
 
114
2. State v. Fritz 
  However, this does very little to distinguish the parties’ 
authority in Lemmer, because the right to litigate evidentiary rulings 
is not exclusively reserved to either party. 
After determining that the state and the Commissioner were 
not the same party, the court then addressed the reasons why they 
are also not in privity.  The Fritz court speaks to the differences in 
procedure that exist between a criminal trial and the findings of 
the administrative review by the Connecticut Department of 
Consumer Protection.115  The court writes that “the state’s interest 
in having guilt or innocence determined is not adequately served 
in an administrative proceeding because... the state’s attorney has 
no control over the timing, substance or litigation of charges 
lodged against the defendant by the department of consumer 
protection.”116
 
 113. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 668 (discussing the contradictory classification of 
parties in House, stating “[b]ecause it was unnecessary in House to decide whether 
the parties were identical, any statements we made about the relationship between 
the parties was necessarily dicta.”). 
 114. State v. House, 291 Minn. 424, 425, 192 N.W.2d 93, 95 (Minn. 1971). 
 115. State v. Fritz, 527 A.2d 1157, 1167 (Conn. 1987). 
 116. Id. 
  This notion highlights one of the fundamental 
misapplications of the rule, which is the presumption that the 
authority of review by the Connecticut Department of Consumer 
18
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Protection is sufficiently analogous to a Minnesota implied consent 
hearing.  This is a substantial component in the logic supporting 
Minnesota’s conclusion that privity does not exist between the state 
and the Commissioner,117 but the holding in Fritz is based more so 
on the difference in venue than the differing authoritative roles of 
the parties.118
The apparent problem in relying on the Fritz case arises from 
the notion that the case refused to find privity because of the 
unfairness to the state’s ability to perform its authoritative 
functions of “investigation and prosecution of criminal matters” 
without relitigating facts that had previously been ruled on under 
administrative review by the Connecticut Department of Consumer 
Protection.
 
119  The Fritz court held that the rulings of an 
administrative proceeding would not invoke the protection of 
collateral estoppel in a subsequent criminal action because to hold 
contrarily would interfere with the state’s duty to investigate and 
prosecute criminal activity.120
3. State v. Miller 
 
For this reason, Fritz is not sufficiently analogous to Lemmer in 
that the Fritz court describes only the divergence between the 
state’s role in a criminal proceeding vis-à-vis a quasi-judicial 
administrative review, devoid of civil or criminal procedural rules 
and further devoid of a state-appointed attorney participation.  
Without these safeguards in place, a government attorney may not 
be afforded a venue that would properly ensure that the 
government could achieve its authoritative purpose.  However, 
because the Lemmer case was conducted under the procedural rules 
of a district court and under the direction of a government 
attorney, it is difficult to find the deficiencies of procedure that 
enabled the Fritz court to deny privity. 
State v. Miller121
 
 117. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 662. 
 118. Fritz, 527 A.2d at 1167. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. State v. Miller, 459 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 1995). 
 is another case relied on by the majority that 
speaks to the pursuits of state agency interests at a quasi-judicial 
administrative proceeding as they differ from the subsequent 
criminal proceeding.  In Miller, the West Virginia Department of 
Health and Human Services was represented by the state Attorney 
19
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General, illustrating a situation more analogous to the instant case 
than Fritz for exemplifying a scenario in which the state agencies 
were formally represented as parties in both the civil and the 
criminal proceedings.122  Despite this similarity to Lemmer—the fact 
that the state was a party to both proceedings—the Miller court 
focused a substantial fraction of the opinion on the notion that the 
authoritative roles were frustrated by procedural differences that 
exist between quasi-judicial rulings and those of a criminal court.123
The court explains that for collateral estoppel to apply, the 
“prior decision must be rendered pursuant to the agency’s 
adjudicatory authority and the procedures employed by the agency 
must be substantially similar to those used in a court”.
 
124  The court 
further concludes that “the Grievance Board has no authority to 
resolve a criminal matter.”125
The majority’s reliance upon Miller for similar arguments 
seems less misplaced than in Fritz, but it still relies on arguments 
founded upon the divergences in procedure and venue. The prior 
ruling in Lemmer was not made before an administrative body in a 
  Application of this logic to Lemmer 
seems an unmerited expansion of the West Virginia approach 
because both actions convened against Mr. Lemmer were in district 
court, where the authority and procedures are incontestably similar 
to “those used in a court.”  In addition to the obvious procedural 
differences between a district court and an agency hearing, the 
reasoning of the Miller court should not have been extended to 
Lemmer because it cannot be said that the county attorney or the 
presiding district court judge who administered Lemmer’s 
preceding civil case lacked the authority to resolve criminal matters 
or the unfair procedural disadvantages that were present in Miller. 
 
 122. Id. at 127. 
 123. Id. at 123. 
 124. Id. (citing to syllabus point two in the case of Vest v. Bd. of Educ. of County 
of Nicholas, 455 S.E.2d 781 (W.Va. 1995) for the proposition that “[f]or issue or 
claim preclusion to attach to quasi-judicial determinations of administrative 
agencies, at least where there is no statutory authority directing otherwise, prior 
decision must be rendered pursuant to agency's adjudicatory authority and 
procedures employed by agency must be substantially similar to those used in 
court; in addition, identicality of the issues litigated is a key component to 
application of administrative res judicata or collateral estoppel.”)  This 
proposition is quoted herein to highlight the difference in the comparisons being 
made in Miller to that of Lemmer. Miller was an examination of the similarity 
between proceedings under the rules an administrative agency to a court, not 
between the comparison of two different sets of court rules as in Lemmer. 
 125. Id. at 123. 
20
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regulatory capacity; it was in fact made in district court.126  In an 
apparent effort to evade “differences in the quality or extensiveness 
of the procedures followed in two courts,”127 the Minnesota 
Supreme Court relies on Miller and Fritz to avoid unfairly 
disadvantaging state prosecutors.  However, in doing so, it 
mislabeled these differences in venue to enable the district court to 
contradict a judgment made by the same court.  The Fritz case 
acknowledges the risk of this specific danger, warning that “the 
same court must not be allowed to reach conflicting rulings.”128
Rulings of this nature seem to have become even more 
difficult to rely on in light of very recent developments in 
Minnesota case-law.  In September 2008, in the case Friends of 
Riverfront v. City of Minneapolis,
 
129 the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
said of finding collateral estoppel, “[w]e do not apply the doctrine 
rigidly, and our focus is on whether the application would work an 
injustice.”130  The court goes on to write that the administrative 
ruling will stand for the purposes of collateral estoppel where “the 
administrative body acted in a quasi-judicial capacity.”131  Finding 
that the administrative agency was acting in a quasi-judicial 
capacity, the court of appeals held that the party desiring to sue was 
defensively estopped by the ruling of the prior administrative 
hearing.132
C. Full and Fair Opportunity 
  An argument like this from the court of appeals does 
significant damage to the theories of varied authority and unfair 
procedural divergence within an administrative proceeding that 
the Minnesota Supreme Court stated would not serve as a basis for 
Lemmer’s invocation of collateral estoppel. 
1. Different Attorneys 
The majority’s next argument posits that the parties are not in 
privity because they are represented by different attorneys133
 
 126. State v. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d 650, 660 (Minn. 2007). 
 127. See State v. Miller, 459 S.E.2d 114, 121 (W. Va. 1995) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(3) (1980)). 
 128. State v. Fritz, 527 A.2d 1157, 1165 (Conn. 1987). 
 129. 751 N.W.2d 586 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008). 
 130. Id. at 589–90. 
 131. Id. at 590. 
 132. Id. 
 whose 
 133. State v. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d 650, 662 (Minn. 2007) (noting that despite 
the fact that a county attorney may request the assistance of the attorney general, 
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respective levels of participation are “unclear.”134  Clarity, however, 
readily presents itself in the statutes controlling the manner by 
which the government agencies choose their legal 
representation.135  The state is free to designate its attorneys as it 
wishes and the statutes are very clear: no statute prohibits the 
county attorney or the attorney general from appearing at either 
the criminal prosecution or the implied consent hearing.136  The 
fundamental bases that the majority utilizes in determining the lack 
of privity between the attorneys are the issues of self-interest and 
the right to appeal.137
Amidst its discussion of the extent to which the lawyers’ 
relationship affects a finding of privity, the court relied on quoting 
the 1940 United States Supreme Court holding of Sunshine 
Anthracite Coal v. Adkins.
 
138  The court writes that the distinguishing 
feature of a lawyer’s relationship to another party is “whether or 
not in the earlier litigation the representative of the [government] 
had authority to represent its interests in a final adjudication of the 
issue in controversy.”139  The Lemmer court mistakenly continues its 
analysis on this issue to determine that there was no privity because 
the attorney in the later proceeding was not afforded the full 
opportunity to litigate the issue.140  In Lemmer, the earlier 
proceeding was the implied consent hearing, in which the district 
attorney achieved a valid and final adjudication of the issue in 
controversy, and therefore under Sunshine, was in privity with all 
other subordinate representatives of that government as it relates 
to that issue.141
 
the attorney general plays a very limited role in criminal prosecutions, and only 
assists at the request of the county attorney or the governor).  See MINN. STAT. § 
8.01 (2006). 
 134. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 663. 
 135. See MINN. STAT. § 8.01 (the attorney general may act as alternative counsel 
in the implied consent proceeding); MINN. STAT. § 169A.53 subdiv. 3(b) 
(permitting representation by attorney general during the DWI prosecution, 
showing that together, these statutes explicitly state that either of the concerned 
attorneys is free to attend and represent the state agency at either of the 
proceedings in question). 
 136. MINN. STAT. §§ 8.01, 169A.53 subdiv. 3(b). 
 137. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 661. 
 138. Id. (citing Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 403 
(1940)). 
 139. Id. (citing Sunshine, 310 U.S. at 403). 
 140. Id. at 660–61. 
 
 141. Sunshine, 310 U.S. at 402–03.  “[The Commission] represented the 
United States in that determination and the delegation of that power to the 
22
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Beyond misinterpreting this United States Supreme Court 
holding, the Lemmer court also disregards Minnesota’s preceding 
trend in finding privity between the attorneys who manage DWI 
cases.142  In 1984, Minnesota acknowledged that criminal and civil 
proceedings and punishments were administered under significant 
differences that made it unfair for the county attorney and the 
attorney general to have to participate in the litigation of the 
other.143  However, the court of appeals reversed this determination 
in 2001, holding that “over time, these differences have blurred 
considerably in ways most closely bearing on the question of 
privity.”144  The reversal of this notion led not only to Minnesota 
being out of line with many other jurisdictions,145
 
Commission was valid, as we have said.  That suit therefore bound the United 
States, as well as the appellant.  Where a suit binds the United States, it binds its 
subordinate officials.”  Id. at 403 (explaining that rulings that are adjudged against 
the government, or a commissioner of a subordinate agency, will be binding upon 
the government and its subordinate agents). 
 142. State v. Victorsen, 627 N.W.2d 655, 660 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). 
 143. State v. Juarez, 345 N.W.2d 801, 803 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).  The Juarez 
court initially found the state and the county attorney were not in privity because 
of the “essential differences” between civil and criminal proceedings that they 
normally handled.  Id.  These notions that supported the absence of privity 
between the governmental actors were considered good law until being overruled 
by Victorsen.  Victorsen, 627 N.W.2d at 661. 
 144. Victorsen, 627 N.W.2d at 661. 
 but also left 
 145. See Briggs v. State, 732 P.2d 1078 (Alaska 1987) (interests of the 
Department of Public Safety were sufficiently represented since the issues were 
fully litigated by another representative of the state); Shackelton v. Dep’t of Motor 
Vehicles, 119 Cal. Rptr. 921 (Ct. App. 1975) (holding that parties to the 
proceedings were the same and the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied to the 
issue of whether the stop was valid and motorist successfully defended the criminal 
charges by showing the arrest was unlawful and sought to preclude that issue in 
the license revocation proceeding); State v. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d 650, 670 (Minn. 
2007) (Hanson, J., dissenting) (“holding that the Oakland County Prosecutor and 
the Michigan Department of Social Services are both creatures of the same 
sovereign, so that the judgment in the administrative proceeding that the 
department failed to prove facts necessary to terminate benefits precluded proof 
of welfare fraud in the criminal proceeding”) (citing People v. Watt, 320 N.W.2d 
333, 336 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982)); Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 670 (Hanson, J., 
dissenting) (“holding that the Department of Social and Health Services, which 
had determined in a dependency proceeding that Williams had not intentionally 
received overpayments, was in privity with the county prosecutor of the welfare 
fraud crime because both ‘represent the State.’”) (citing State v. Williams, 937 
P.2d 1052, 1057 (Wash. 1997)); State v. Summers, 513 S.E.2d 575, 578 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1999) (noting that privity must be determined by examining the substantial 
relationships of rights between the parties and not merely on the basis of each 
party differing in name), aff’d, 528 S.E.2d 17 (N.C. 2000).  See also Brower v. 
Killens, 472 S.E.2d 33 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the department of motor 
vehicles was fully protected in the criminal case where the interests of the state 
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Minnesota subject to the previously recognized risks of the 
“institutionalization of a process whereby duplicative proceedings 
are frequent with inconsistent outcomes a distinct possibility.”146
2. Self-Interest 
 
Another blurred distinction is that which speaks to the self-
interest to participate under the increasing reliance that both 
attorneys have upon each other to implement the emergent 
penalties attached to DWIs.  The Lemmer court writes that the state 
had a “lack of interest in the outcome of the hearing.”147  This 
asserted lack of interest does not accurately describe the fact that 
the Commissioner of Public Safety can now use prior criminal 
convictions as ammunition for “lengthening the duration of 
administrative license revocations.”148  Conversely, “[p]enalty 
enhancements are now available to criminal prosecutors by virtue 
of license revocations pursuant to the implied consent statute.”149  
This evolution allows both prosecutors in the DWI suits to charge 
penalties of greater degree based on the prior outcomes the other 
agency achieves against defendants, and conversely rests the 
effective prosecution of their desired case on the successful results 
obtained by the other agency.150
It is settled that the party in interest is the party “entitled 
under the substantive law to enforce the right sued upon and who 
generally, but not necessarily, benefits from the action’s final 
outcome.”
 
151
 
were argued by the local district attorney); State v. Williams, 667 N.E.2d 932, 936 
(Ohio 1996) (“[T]he state acts through its various agencies and entities, and the 
Bureau of Motor Vehicles is an agency of the state.  We conclude that the state of 
Ohio is the real party in interest in both proceedings and the requirement of 
privity as an element of issue preclusion is satisfied.”); State v. Griese, No. 03-3097-
CR, 2004 WL 2002492 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2004).  The court of appeals in Griese 
suppressed evidence under collateral estoppel because the district court already 
decided the issue in a prior adjudication that was on the merits and to which the 
state was a party.  Griese, 2004 WL 2002492, at *4.  The court focused on whether 
the different burdens in the two proceedings would result in injustice against the 
state, but ultimately concluded that it would not.  Id. at *2.  Therefore, because the 
representatives in both the administrative and criminal proceedings were the State 
of Wisconsin, collateral estoppel applied.  Id. at *3. 
 146. Victorsen, 627 N.W.2d at 662. 
 147. State v. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d 650, 663 (Minn. 2007). 
 148. Victorsen, 627 N.W.2d at 661. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See id. 
 151. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 279 (8th ed. 2004). 
  These criteria are clearly satisfied by the interests of 
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the parties in Lemmer because the state and the commissioner 
benefit from a successful outcome in the other’s prior suit.152  The 
United States Supreme Court stated the principle more specifically, 
positing that it is unfair and burdensome for the system to allow a 
party with knowledge of a judgment’s potentially adverse effects to 
take a “wait-and-see” attitude about the outcome of the prior suit 
before determining that the party wants to relitigate in the event of 
a loss.153
Viewing the incentives of each party through the lens of the 
aforementioned evolutions in prosecuting Minnesota DWI cases, 
this “symbiotic” relationship
 
154 alone should sufficiently overcome 
the Lemmer majority’s determination that any self-interest did not 
motivate the attorneys representing the state agency.  The 
dissenting opinion also notes that the other competing interests 
between the attorneys are irrelevant because both agencies had 
authority to represent the state’s agenda.155  The court should have 
agreed that the two attorneys were aware that they stood to benefit 
from the action of the other and that both also realized that failure 
to participate could cost them the ability to further prosecute issues 
resolved adversely to their goals.156
 
 152. Victorsen, 627 N.W.2d at 662. 
 153. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979).  The court 
expands the reasoning of the Blonder-Tongue decision to further abandon the 
requirement of mutuality and allow offensive issues preclusion as long as each 
party is adequately represented at the first action.  Id. at 331.  Following this rule, 
issue preclusion can be used by a person who was not a party to the original suit.  
Id.  The Supreme Court discusses the situations in which application of non-
mutual issue preclusion is fair.  One of the factors to consider is whether the 
estopped party’s interests were adequately represented in the first adjudication.  
Id. at 330.  The court goes on to say that one consideration in determining the 
adequacy of the interests that are being represented is whether the party being 
estopped could have joined and had the incentive to join the prior action.  Id.  
The court writes that part of the unfairness to defendants in requiring mutuality is 
that “potential plaintiffs will have everything to gain and nothing to lose by not 
intervening in the first action.”  Id. 
 154. Victorsen, 627 N.W.2d at 662. 
 155. State v. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d 650, 666 (Minn. 2007).  If the 
Commissioner had authority to represent the state in the implied consent 
proceeding, the interests of the state were represented.  See Sunshine Anthracite 
Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402–03 (1940). 
 156. See Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 663. 
  Beyond these apparent shared 
interests, other courts have found privity due to common interest 
because both attorneys in this situation are appointed to serve in 
the common representation of state citizens and pursue the 
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overarching objective of making the roadways safer.157
The increased interdependence in prosecutions makes it 
difficult to imagine why in 2007 the Minnesota Supreme Court 
reverted to resting its argument on this separation of attorney 
interests that had previously been called “a fictional construct.”
 
158  
The failure of the state to communicate in an effort to aggregate 
the prosecution of these identical interests wastes judicial resources 
and congests dockets to cut against the public trust in our courts.159  
Most importantly, subjecting defendants to this type of 
unpredictability results in “the potential for inconsistency.... 
[which] is among the most objectionable results of the present 
system.”160
3. Notice to the Parties and the Right to Appeal 
 
The last primary argument on which the court relies in 
determining that collateral estoppel should not be applied is that 
the state was denied a full and fair opportunity to be heard at the 
implied consent proceeding based on notice and appeal.161  
However, this reliance appears unfounded because the state was 
notified of its opportunity to attend the implied consent hearing,162
 
 157. See, e.g., State v. Summers, 513 S.E.2d 575 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (noting 
that regardless of the particular issues in DWI cases that are charged, the real 
interest of both the DMV and the State is to keep unsafe drivers off of the roads).  
State v. Williams, 667 N.E.2d 932, 936 (Ohio 1996) (“The state acts through its 
various agencies and entities, and the Bureau of Motor Vehicles is an agency of the 
state.  We conclude that the state of Ohio is the real party in interest in both 
proceedings and the requirement of privity as an element of issue preclusion is 
satisfied.”). 
 158. Victorsen, 627 N.W.2d at 661–62.  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 169A.52 subdiv. 4 
(increasing duration of administrative license revocations with prior license 
revocation); MINN. STAT. §§ 169A.25–26 (elevating severity of DWI offenses to a 
gross misdemeanor if the offender had a driving-while-impaired violation within 
the past ten years under section 169A.095); MINN. STAT. § 169A.275 (increasing 
the mandatory penalties for each prior driving-while-impaired violation that a 
single defendant receives within a ten-year period); MINN. STAT. § 169A.28 
(providing for mandatory consecutive sentences if the person has prior driving-
while-impaired violations); MINN. STAT. § 169A.31 (elevating severity of alcohol-
related bus driving offenses to a gross misdemeanor if the offender had a prior 
license revocation within the past ten years). 
 159. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 664–65 (Hanson, J., dissenting). 
 160. Victorsen, 627 N.W.2d at 662. 
 161. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 663. 
 162. Id. 
 
and no statute bars either attorney from participating in either 
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proceeding.163  As the dissent obviates, when a prosecutor is given 
notice and an opportunity to participate in a hearing, that 
prosecutor, at a later hearing, will be estopped from opposing the 
binding effect of an order resulting from the earlier hearing.164
The state prosecutor cannot claim to have been relying in 
good faith upon section  169A.53.3(g)
 
165 because the statute was 
overturned by the Brunclik injunction.166  Furthermore, the state 
was entirely aware that the issues addressed in implied consent 
proceedings are sometimes identical to those addressed in DWI 
prosecutions and could be handled by either attorney who is 
notified to appear.167  The state forwent its right to appeal the 
judgment when it disregarded the notice of its opportunity to 
litigate a subject in which it had incentive to participate.  This 
failure to cooperate costs each department the resources consumed 
by relitigation of the issues that could have been decided together 
in one joint action.168
D. Where Is the Brunclik Injunction? 
 
This policy discussion also emphasizes that the Supreme Court 
of Minnesota, reviewing this case de novo, refused to hear the 
argument over the Brunclik injunction because it was not raised at 
trial.169  The court “may not base its decision on matters outside the 
record on appeal, and that matters not produced and received in 
evidence below may not be considered.”170
 
 163. See Id. at 654 (observing that “[t]he district court took Brunclik into 
consideration and issued an order adopting the reasoning of Brunclik and 
dismissing the charges against Lemmer.”). 
 164. Id. at 663 n.7. 
 165. See id. at 659. 
 166. See id. at 654. 
 167. Id. at 655 (discussing the exact similarity of the issues presented in both 
cases, noting that MINN. STAT. § 169A.20 subdiv. 1 controls the criminal DWI 
elements that determine whether the defendant operated or had physical control 
of any motor vehicle, was under the influence of alcohol, and had an alcohol 
concentration of 0.08 or more).  The court held also that MINN. STAT. § 169A.52 
subdiv. 4 determines the exact same issue of whether an individual is operating or 
in physical control of a motor vehicle.  Id. 
 168. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.9 (4th ed. 2005) 
(noting the costs of trying the same issue twice). 
 169. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 656. 
 170. Plowman v. Copeland, Buhl & Co., Ltd., 261 N.W.2d 581, 583 (Minn. 
1977).  See also MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 103.04 (2006). 
  However, evidence was 
received below; it was “evident that the district court was aware of 
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the Brunclik decision.”171  The supreme court’s failure to apply 
judicially created law regarding collateral estoppel was based on the 
thought that the district court was aware of the Brunclik decision, 
but the record does not indicate that Lemmer sought to enforce 
the Brunclik injunction.172  The fact that the court was aware of this 
injunction should have also precluded the statute from being 
allowed to stand as a matter of comity, which is an option of the 
judiciary only in situations where the judiciary’s authority will not 
be in conflict with the statute.173
E. Why Isn’t This Double Jeopardy? 
  Refusing to apply this injunction is 
essentially a failure by the court to uphold its prior understanding 
of the separation of powers and a forfeiture of the judiciary’s right 
to mandate its own procedures.  This further corrodes the public 
trust, allowing a seemingly applicable rule of procedure to be 
ignored to produce immeasurably inconsistent results. 
The obvious response to the majority’s argument is to 
conclude that this ruling sacrifices the constitutionally guaranteed 
rights under the Fifth Amendment, which guarantees protection 
against “‘a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal... 
[or] conviction.  And it protects against multiple punishments for 
the same offense.’”174  The doctrine can be subtly distinguished 
from res judicata based claims in that collateral estoppel bars 
relitigation of facts, while double jeopardy bars prosecuting 
“conduct identical and/or similar to conduct for which he had 
already been prosecuted.”175
 
 171. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 656. 
 172. Id. at 656. 
 173. See State v. Lindsey, 632 N.W.2d 652, 659 (Minn. 2001). The court noted 
that it has “occasionally permitted a statute to stand as a matter of comity, even 
where the legislature has encroached somewhat upon a judicial function, so long 
as the statute does not conflict with this court's inherent authority to make the 
final decision.’”  Id. at n.2. 
 174. United States v. Felix, 926 F.2d 1522, 1525 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting 
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)). 
 175. United States v. Rogers, 960 F.2d 1501, 1506 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting that 
the government is collaterally estopped from prosecuting defendant for issues that 
had been resolved adversely to the government in a prior civil suit). 
  The Supreme Court has held that two 
mechanisms overlap to the degree that “[t]he question is no longer 
whether collateral estoppel is a requirement of due process, but 
whether it is a part of the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against 
28
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double jeopardy.... We do not hesitate to hold that it is.”176
The critical test set forth by the Supreme Court to distinguish 
the situations in which double jeopardy can be implicated is one 
that examines “what conduct the State will prove, not the evidence 
the State will use to prove that conduct.”
 
177
One possible justification for a court’s reliance upon the 
presumption that double jeopardy was inapplicable can be found 
in the Miller case discussed previously.  Miller argues that double 
jeopardy cannot be invoked when the desired civil punishment 
“has not been recognized as a criminal sanction.”
  Because the aspects of 
the conduct that the state must prove in the instant case are 
identical in both the criminal and the civil suits, the resolution of 
the double jeopardy argument must necessarily look beyond the 
Lemmer opinion, which did not directly address double jeopardy. 
178  The Supreme 
Court has also addressed this distinction by explaining that “the 
only proscription... is that the Government may not criminally 
prosecute a defendant, impose a criminal penalty upon him, and 
then bring a separate civil action based on the same conduct and 
receive a judgment that is not rationally related to the goal of 
making the Government whole.”179  In determining whether a 
second penalty is part of an effort to make the government whole, 
“the defendant is entitled to an accounting of the Government’s 
damages and costs to determine if the penalty sought in fact 
constitutes a second punishment.”180
In the instant case and in many DWI cases, the government 
cannot assert any actual damages; therefore, almost any civil 
penalty would meet the Supreme Court definition of double 
jeopardy punishment.  In light of the fact that “implied consents 
have become means to enhance the charges and to impose 
mandatory/consecutive penalties,”
 
181
 
 176. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 442, 445 (1970). 
 177. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 521 (1990). 
 178. State v. Miller, 459 S.E.2d 114, 123 n.14 (W. Va. 1995) (discussing that 
courts have never considered imposition of civil penalties, specifically termination 
of employment, as a criminal sanction). 
 179. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 451 (1989). 
 180. Id. at 449. 
 181. Frederic Bruno, Perspectives on the Law, 58 BENCH & B. MINN. 36 (2001). 
 a strong case could have been 
presented on Lemmer’s behalf that the prosecution of his conduct 
by way of the illegally obtained evidence was in fact double 
jeopardy.  While the issue of collateral estoppel in future cases that 
involve multiple government agencies seems unpredictable by 
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Lemmer, future defendants should argue that this type of relitigation 
is barred from being prosecuted based on conduct under the Fifth 
Amendment rather than by the common law doctrine of collateral 
estoppel as applied to evidentiary rulings. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Minnesota, the doctrine of collateral estoppel reflects 
common law principles evolving to protect vital safeguards of 
individual liberties and reducing the constantly escalating stress 
upon judicial resources.182  The Lemmer decision establishes the rule 
that the Commissioner of Public Safety and his state employer are 
not in privity, defying the general rule of privity between 
government agencies and denying the application of collateral 
estoppel.183  This certainly ensures the state will be fully heard in 
both the civil and criminal proceedings of a DWI, but at what cost 
to the judiciary and the individual defendant?  It is axiomatic that 
the inequity and confusion caused by this failure to apply collateral 
estoppel will challenge the reliability of our courts, amplify the cost 
of litigation,184 and predict an uncertain future for an “essential 
part of the Constitution’s prohibition against double jeopardy.”185
 
 182. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 647 N.W.2d 553, 560 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) 
(discussing benefits of doctrine). 
 183. See 47 AM. JUR. 2D JUDGMENTS § 623 (2008) (stating general understanding 
of privity between state and officials). 
 184. See, e.g., Ill. Farmers, 647 N.W.2d at 560. 
 185. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. at 448 (Black, J., concurring) (noting the 
importance of collateral estoppel as it relates to the similar protections against 
being tried twice for the same conduct under the Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution). 
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